AQA A-Level Philosophy | Paper 2 | 2026 Predicted Paper | Question 6, 7 & 8 Mark Scheme
Question 6
What is meant by the claim that interactionist dualism involves causal interaction between mental and physical states?
[3 marks]
What is expected
This is a short 3-mark AO1 question. The student needs to state precisely what interactionist dualism claims, especially what causal interaction means. AQA's command-word guidance indicates that questions asking what something means require a precise statement or explanation of the concept, so a few accurate sentences are enough.
AQA defines interactionist dualism as a form of dualism in which mental and physical states are ontologically distinct but can causally affect one another in both directions.
Indicative content
Award credit for points such as:
interactionist dualism maintains a distinction between the mental and the physical
mental states or events can cause physical states or events
physical states or events can cause mental states or events
therefore the causal relationship is two-way
an appropriate example may illustrate either direction, such as:
a desire or intention causing bodily movement
bodily injury causing the mental state of pain
For full marks, the answer should make clear that this is not simply a claim that mind and body are different. The distinctive feature being tested is their two-way causal interaction.
Example answer
Interactionist dualism holds that mental states and physical states are distinct but can cause changes in each other. For example, a desire can cause the body to move, while physical damage to the body can cause the mental experience of pain. Causation therefore works in both directions.
Likely mark: 3/3
Example examiner commentary
This would receive full marks because it identifies the distinctive commitment of interactionist dualism rather than merely defining dualism in general. It makes the two directions of causation explicit and uses examples appropriately.
A weaker response might say:
The mind and body are two different things but they interact.
That is broadly relevant, but it does not explain what the interaction actually consists in. AQA examiner reports consistently reward greater conceptual precision in short questions. For example, the 2023 report noted that stronger responses on dualism made the relevant distinctions explicit, whereas weaker answers often showed only a vague grasp of the position.
The student should also avoid confusing interactionist dualism with epiphenomenalism. Interactionism allows mental-to-physical and physical-to-mental causation. Epiphenomenalism does not allow mental states to have physical effects.
Question 7
Explain why mind-brain type identity theory involves an ontological reduction but not an analytic reduction.
[5 marks]
What is expected
This is a 5-mark AO1 explanation question. "Explain why" means the student needs to do more than define mind-brain type identity theory. They should explain the distinction between ontological reduction and analytic reduction, and show how identity theory fits one but not the other. For 5-mark "Explain" questions, AQA expects detailed explanation, including relevant implications and connections where appropriate.
AQA explicitly defines mind-brain type identity theory as a reductive physicalist theory in which types of mental states are ontologically, but not analytically, identical to types of brain states.
Indicative content
Students may explain that:
mind-brain type identity theory is a physicalist theory
it claims that types of mental state are identical with types of brain or neural state
this is an ontological reduction because what appear to be mental states and brain states are, in reality, the same kind of phenomenon
therefore the theory does not posit mental states as an additional non-physical substance or property over and above the relevant brain states
however, this is not an analytic reduction
"mental state" and "brain state" are not synonymous expressions
the meaning of a mental-state term cannot simply be analysed or translated into the meaning of a brain-state term
therefore the identity claimed is an identity in what exists, rather than an identity produced merely by analysing the meanings of the terms
Students do not need to evaluate the theory or discuss objections such as multiple realisability.
Example answer
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