Block's China and Mary | AQA A-Level Philosophy
Updated: Nov 4
For Specification 7172
AQA A-Level Philosophy | Free Revision Notes
Estimated study time: 65 to 75 minutes
This Block's China and Mary A-Level Philosophy revision lesson examines two AQA-specified challenges to functionalism. Ned Block's China thought experiment asks whether a system could duplicate the functional organisation associated with a mind while lacking mentality or qualia altogether. Jackson's Knowledge/Mary argument can then be reapplied to functional facts, asking whether knowing every fact about functional organisation would still leave something unknown about phenomenal experience. Both objections challenge the claim that functional roles provide a complete account of mental states.
Learning Objectives 🎯
By the end of this revision page, you should be able to:
Explain Ned Block's China thought experiment.
Analyse the possibility of a functional duplicate without mentality or qualia.
Apply the Knowledge/Mary argument to functional facts.
Explain why functional facts may be insufficient to account for phenomenal properties.
Compare Block's China with the inverted qualia objection.
Evaluate whether functionalism can provide a complete account of mental states.
Revision Notes 📚
Block's China and Mary A-Level Philosophy Revision: the central issue
Functionalism [Functionalism] claims that:
All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.
A functional role consists in causal relationships between:
environmental inputs
internal states
behavioural outputs
The theory therefore claims that what matters for mentality is not one particular physical constitution but the functional organisation of the system.
AQA specifies three problems for functionalism:
a functional duplicate with different qualia, examined in Inverted Qualia [Inverted Qualia]
a functional duplicate with no mentality or qualia, examined through Block's China
the Knowledge/Mary argument applied to functional facts
The last two are the focus of this lesson.
Recap: functional duplicates
Two systems are functional duplicates when their states play the same functional roles.
Their causal organisation is equivalent in terms of:
environmental inputs
internal states
behavioural outputs
Functional duplicates do not need to possess the same physical constitution.
Functionalism allows the same mental state to be multiply realised in physically different systems.
The question raised by Block is:
Is duplicating functional organisation enough to guarantee mentality?
Block's China Thought Experiment
The basic scenario
Ned Block asks us to imagine a hypothetical system involving the population of China.
Using two-way radios, the population collectively duplicates the functions of a brain.
The system therefore reproduces the relevant functional organisation.
Its states have the same kinds of causal relationships as the states of a system that functionalism regards as possessing mental states.
If functionalism is correct, the China system should therefore qualify as possessing mental states.
This includes mental states involving qualia.
Why the China system matters
Functionalism says that what determines a mental state is its functional role.
The particular physical material realising the role does not matter.
So if:
a brain realises a particular functional organisation
and:
the China system realises the same functional organisation
then the functionalist appears committed to treating the relevant states in the same way.
The system would be a functional duplicate.
The argument's intuitive force
Block asks whether we should really accept that the China system possesses mentality or qualia.
Many people may find this conclusion highly counterintuitive.
The system consists of a huge number of people communicating through radios.
Even if their collective activity duplicates the functions of a brain, it may seem implausible to say:
The system as a whole has conscious experiences.
Block's argument uses this apparent implausibility against functionalism.
Reconstructing Block's China Argument
The argument can be presented as follows:
Functionalism claims that mental states are characterised by their functional roles.
Therefore, any system that duplicates the relevant functional roles should possess the corresponding mental states.
The population of China could hypothetically use two-way radios to duplicate the functions of a brain.
Functionalism is therefore committed to saying that the China system has mental states, including qualia.
It is highly counterintuitive to say that such a system would possess mentality or qualia.
If we reject the conclusion that the China system has mental states, we should reject the functionalist theory that generates that conclusion.
The key structure is:
same functional organisation + apparently no mentality
This is different from inverted qualia.
A Functional Duplicate with No Mentality
AQA describes the issue as:
the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality or qualia
This attacks the sufficiency of functional organisation.
Functionalism claims that possessing the appropriate functional state is enough to possess the mental state.
Block asks us to imagine:
the appropriate functional organisation is present
but:
mentality is absent.
If such a case is genuinely possible, then functional organisation is not sufficient for mentality.
Necessary versus sufficient
This is useful exam language.
Functionalism proposes that the correct functional role is sufficient for the relevant mental state.
Block's China challenges this.
If China can duplicate the functional organisation without possessing consciousness, then:
having the functional organisation is not sufficient for having the mental state.
That would undermine functionalism's central claim.
Why Qualia Matter
The thought experiment becomes particularly powerful when applied to qualia.
Qualia concern:
what it is like to have an experience.
The China system might reproduce:
inputs
outputs
internal functional relationships
yet it may still seem that:
there is nothing it is like to be the system.
If so, function has failed to guarantee phenomenal consciousness.
The argument therefore targets the same general pressure point as Inverted Qualia [Inverted Qualia]:
Can functional organisation fully explain phenomenal experience?
Block's China Versus Inverted Qualia
The two objections are closely related but should not be confused.
Inverted qualia
The subjects possess mentality, but their qualia differ despite functional identity.
The structure is:
same function + different qualia
Block's China
The proposed system has the appropriate functional organisation but allegedly lacks mentality or qualia.
The structure is:
same function + no qualia
The distinction can be summarised:
Inverted qualia | Block's China |
Functional duplicates | Functional duplicate |
Both possess experience | China may lack experience |
Qualia differ | Qualia absent |
Challenges whether function determines which qualia occur | Challenges whether function guarantees mentality at all |
Both argue that functional facts may fail to determine phenomenal facts.
Why the China Argument Challenges Functionalism
The objection targets functionalism on its own terms.
Functionalism deliberately allows:
different physical realisations of the same functional state.
This was one of its strengths in Functionalism [Functionalism].
The theory avoids the multiple-realisation problem facing Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory] by saying that physical constitution does not determine mental-state type.
Block exploits this flexibility.
If physical constitution does not matter, then an extremely unusual physical system should still possess the mental state provided that it implements the appropriate functional organisation.
The China system is designed to make that implication look implausible.
Evaluating Block's China
Strength: it exposes a consequence of multiple realisability
Functionalism cannot easily respond:
"The China system is made from the wrong physical material."
That would undermine the theory's own commitment to multiple realisability.
Functionalism says that the same functional role can be instantiated by physically different systems.
The physical strangeness of the China system therefore cannot by itself exclude mentality.
Strength: it targets phenomenal consciousness
The objection does not simply ask whether the system could produce the right behaviour.
It asks whether the system would actually possess:
mentality
consciousness
qualia
This focuses on whether functional organisation is genuinely enough for phenomenal experience.
Functionalist response: accept the conclusion
A functionalist can simply accept that if the China system genuinely duplicated the relevant functional organisation, then it would possess mental states.
The fact that this appears counterintuitive does not automatically show that it is false.
This response challenges the argumentative force of Block's thought experiment.
The critic says:
"Surely the China system would not be conscious."
The functionalist can reply:
"Why not, if it genuinely has the required functional organisation?"
The burden then shifts back to the critic.
Is counterintuitiveness enough?
This is the central evaluative question.
Block's argument has force because the idea of the China system possessing qualia may seem highly implausible.
However:
counterintuitive does not automatically mean impossible.
If the objection relies only on an intuition that the system lacks mentality, the functionalist can reject that intuition.
A successful criticism needs reason to think that:
functional duplication really can occur without mentality.
Simply finding the consequence surprising may not be enough.
The deeper disagreement
The disagreement can be expressed clearly.
The functionalist says:
If the functional organisation is genuinely the same, the relevant mental states are present.
Block's objection says:
Functional organisation could be present without genuine mentality or qualia.
Neither claim can simply be assumed.
The thought experiment is successful only if the second claim is more convincing.
The Knowledge/Mary Argument Reapplied
The second major objection in this lesson takes the argument from Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument [Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument] and applies it specifically to functional facts.
The original Mary argument challenged reductive physicalism.
Here, the question becomes:
Could someone know all the functional facts about a mental state while still not knowing what the experience is like?
If yes, functional facts may be incomplete.
Recap: Mary
Mary is a scientist specialising in the neurophysiology of colour vision.
She has lived in a black-and-white environment.
She knows all the relevant physical information about what occurs when people see colour.
When she sees colour for the first time, Jackson asks whether she learns something new.
The original argument claims that she learns something about:
the phenomenal properties or qualia of colour vision.
This was used to challenge the claim that all facts about mental states are physical facts.
Mary and Functional Facts
The argument can be adapted.
Imagine Mary possesses complete knowledge of all the functional facts about colour experience.
She knows everything about:
relevant environmental inputs
internal functional states
relationships between internal states
behavioural outputs
In other words, she possesses all the facts about the functional role associated with colour experience.
Yet she has never herself experienced colour.
When she finally sees colour, ask:
Does she learn what the experience is like?
If yes, then knowing all the functional facts did not provide complete knowledge of the mental state.
Reconstructing Mary Against Functionalism
The argument can be set out as follows:
Functionalism claims that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles.
Suppose Mary knows all the functional facts about colour vision.
Before experiencing colour, Mary still does not know what colour experience is like.
When she experiences colour for the first time, she appears to learn something about its qualia.
Therefore, all the functional facts do not explain everything about the mental state.
Qualia cannot be fully characterised by functional facts alone.
Functionalism is therefore incomplete or false.
The key structure is:
all functional facts + something about qualia still unknown
Why This Challenges Functionalism More Directly Than the Original Mary Argument
The original Mary argument targets physical facts.
The functionalist, however, defines mental states through their functional roles.
So the objection must be reformulated.
The relevant question is no longer merely:
Does Mary know all the physical facts?
It becomes:
Does Mary know all the functional facts?
If complete functional knowledge still fails to reveal what colour experience is like, then functionalism has failed to capture the phenomenal property.
Functional Knowledge Versus Phenomenal Knowledge
The objection distinguishes:
Functional knowledge
Knowledge of:
inputs
internal causal relations
outputs
the complete functional organisation of the relevant states
Phenomenal knowledge
Knowledge of:
what the experience is like.
Mary supposedly possesses the first without the second.
This suggests that:
functional facts are not sufficient to explain qualia.
The Central AQA Claim
AQA formulates the challenge directly:
No amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia.
This is the central point to remember.
The objection does not merely say that functional descriptions are difficult or incomplete in practice.
It claims that even complete functional information may leave phenomenal experience unexplained.
Mary and Inverted Qualia Compared
Both objections challenge the connection between function and qualia.
Inverted qualia
Same functional facts, different qualia.
Mary applied to functional facts
Complete knowledge of functional facts, but qualia still not fully known.
The first concerns possible differences between subjects.
The second concerns the apparent incompleteness of knowledge.
Both challenge the claim:
functional facts completely characterise phenomenal mental states.
Mary and Block's China Compared
The two arguments in this lesson attack functionalism from different directions.
Block's China
Asks:
Could the complete functional organisation exist without mentality or qualia?
Structure:
function without experience
Mary
Asks:
Could all functional facts be known without knowing the phenomenal character of experience?
Structure:
knowledge of function without knowledge of experience
Together they create a cumulative challenge.
One focuses on what exists.
The other focuses on what can be known.
Is Mary's New Knowledge Really New Propositional Knowledge?
This question was central in Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument [Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument].
The earlier responses included:
ability knowledge
acquaintance knowledge
New Knowledge/Old Fact
These responses are important when evaluating the original argument against reductive physicalism.
When applying Mary to functionalism, the crucial issue remains whether Mary's first colour experience reveals a fact that could not be captured by the complete functional description.
If what she gains is not a genuinely new fact about the mental state, the argument against functionalism is weakened.
Ability knowledge response
One response is that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge.
Instead, she gains new abilities associated with colour experience.
If so:
knowing all the functional facts may still be complete propositional knowledge
even though first-hand experience gives Mary new abilities.
This weakens the claim that functional facts are incomplete.
Acquaintance knowledge response
Another response is that Mary gains direct acquaintance with the experience.
Again, this need not mean she learns a new proposition that was missing from the functional account.
The distinction becomes:
knowing all the facts
versus:
being directly acquainted with the experience.
If Mary's gain is merely acquaintance, functionalism may not be refuted.
The key limitation
These responses need to show that Mary's new experience does not reveal a genuinely new fact that falls outside the functional account.
If she does acquire new propositional knowledge about qualia, the functionalist still faces the original problem:
complete functional knowledge was incomplete.
Evaluating Mary Against Functionalism
Strength: it directly targets phenomenal completeness
Functionalism claims that all mental states can be characterised functionally.
Mary suggests that even complete functional information does not tell us:
what an experience is like.
If correct, phenomenal properties escape functional analysis.
Strength: complete information is stipulated
The objection does not merely say:
Mary happens not to know enough functional science.
She is supposed to know all the relevant functional facts.
The problem is therefore one of principle rather than incomplete scientific knowledge.
Functionalist response
The functionalist can challenge the conclusion that Mary learns a new fact.
She may instead acquire:
an ability
acquaintance with colour experience
without discovering a new proposition beyond the functional facts.
If so, the difference between pre-release and post-release Mary does not establish that functionalism is false.
Does Mary Prove Qualia Are Non-Functional?
Not automatically.
The argument succeeds only if:
Mary knows all functional facts before experiencing colour.
She genuinely gains new propositional knowledge when she experiences colour.
The new fact concerns a phenomenal property.
That fact cannot itself be captured functionally.
Each step can be challenged.
Therefore, a strong evaluation should not simply say:
"Mary learns something new, so functionalism is false."
The nature of what she learns must be established.
Does Either Argument Prove Property Dualism?
No.
If Block's China or Mary successfully refutes functionalism, the immediate conclusion is:
Functional facts do not provide a complete account of mentality or qualia.
It does not automatically follow that:
qualia must be non-physical properties.
Further argument would be needed to establish Property Dualism [Property Dualism].
This is the same important principle seen elsewhere in the unit:
Refuting one physicalist theory does not automatically establish dualism.
Bringing Together the Three Problems for Functionalism
Across Inverted Qualia [Inverted Qualia] and this lesson, AQA specifies three challenges.
Objection | Functional facts | Phenomenal facts |
Inverted qualia | Same | Different |
Block's China | Appropriate functional organisation present | Mentality or qualia allegedly absent |
Mary applied to functional facts | All functional facts known | Qualia still allegedly not fully known |
The recurring problem is:
Does function determine phenomenal consciousness?
A Cumulative Argument Against Functionalism
The objections can be combined.
Inverted qualia
Function may not determine which qualia occur.
Block's China
Function may not guarantee that any qualia occur.
Mary
Knowledge of all functional facts may not provide knowledge of what qualia are like.
Together, they suggest that phenomenal consciousness may not be reducible to functional organisation.
This is the central challenge functionalism must overcome.
Functionalism's Overall Response
The functionalist can resist the common assumption behind all three objections.
That assumption is:
qualia can vary independently of functional organisation.
The functionalist may deny this.
They can argue:
genuine functional duplicates cannot have genuinely different mental states
a genuine functional duplicate such as the China system would possess mentality
Mary's new experience does not give her a new fact outside the functional account
If these responses succeed, the objections do not establish that function leaves out anything mental.
The Role of Intuition
Both Block's China and Mary depend partly upon powerful intuitions.
Block asks us to find it implausible that the China system would possess consciousness.
Mary asks us to find it obvious that Mary learns something when she first experiences colour.
But philosophical evaluation requires more than saying:
"That seems obvious."
Students should ask:
what exactly does the intuition establish?
is the scenario genuinely possible?
does Mary acquire a new fact?
does counterintuitiveness establish falsity?
The strongest answers analyse the inference rather than simply repeating the thought experiment.
Comparing Functionalism with Earlier Physicalist Theories
Functionalism was attractive because it appeared to improve upon earlier approaches.
Compared with behaviourism
It includes internal causal states rather than reducing mentality to behaviour.
Compared with identity theory
It accepts multiple realisability rather than tying each mental-state type to one physical type.
But the qualia problem remains
The functionalist solution creates a new question:
Can causal role capture phenomenal character?
Block's China and Mary both suggest that the answer may be no.
This is why qualia remain central across the whole Metaphysics of Mind unit.
What You Need to Be Able to Do in an Examination
For this topic, you should be able to:
define functionalism
define a functional duplicate
explain Ned Block's China thought experiment
state that the population of China uses two-way radios to duplicate the functions of a brain
explain why functionalism appears committed to attributing mental states to the system
explain why the conclusion may seem counterintuitive
explain the structure functional organisation without mentality
distinguish Block's China from inverted qualia
explain the Knowledge/Mary argument
adapt Mary from physical facts to functional facts
explain why complete functional knowledge may allegedly leave qualia unexplained
state the central claim that no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia
evaluate ability-knowledge and acquaintance-knowledge style responses where relevant
distinguish knowledge of function from phenomenal experience
compare Block's China, inverted qualia and Mary
explain why refuting functionalism would not automatically prove property dualism
construct a reasoned overall judgement about whether functional roles fully explain mentality
The central question is:
Can a complete account of what a mental state does explain what that mental state is like to experience?
Key Words 🔑
Key word | Student-friendly definition | How it may be used in an exam |
China thought experiment | Block's hypothetical scenario in which the population of China uses two-way radios to duplicate the functions of a brain. | Explain the possibility of functional organisation without mentality or qualia. |
Functional duplicate | A system whose states play the same functional roles as the corresponding states of another system. | Explain why functionalism appears committed to attributing mentality to the China system. |
Qualia | Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible, concerning what experience is like. | Identify what Block and Mary claim functional facts may fail to explain. |
Functional facts | Facts concerning the causal roles of states, including their relationships with inputs, outputs and internal states. | Explain how Mary can be reformulated as an objection specifically to functionalism. |
Phenomenal property | An experiential feature of a conscious mental state. | Explain the apparent gap between functional organisation and conscious experience. |
Common Mistakes ⚠️
Mistake: Saying Block's China is simply a physically identical brain
Why this is incorrect:The point of functionalism is that the same functional organisation can have a very different physical realisation.
How to improve:State that the population of China, using two-way radios, duplicates the functions of the brain.
Mistake: Saying Block proves that the China system definitely has no mental states
Why this is incorrect:The thought experiment is an objection designed to make functionalism's conclusion appear highly counterintuitive.
How to improve:Explain that the functionalist can accept the consequence and argue that a genuine functional duplicate would possess mental states.
Mistake: Confusing Block's China with inverted qualia
Why this is incorrect:In inverted qualia, both subjects possess experience but their qualia differ.
Block's China asks whether the relevant functional organisation could exist with no mentality or qualia.
How to improve:Remember:
inverted qualia = same function, different qualia
China = same function, allegedly no qualia
Mistake: Applying Mary only to physical facts
Why this is incorrect:In this part of the specification, Mary must be applied specifically to functional facts.
How to improve:Ask whether Mary could know every fact about functional roles and still fail to know what colour experience is like.
Mistake: Saying that learning something after seeing colour automatically proves functionalism false
Why this is incorrect:The functionalist can challenge whether Mary gains genuinely new propositional knowledge.
How to improve:Consider whether she instead gains ability knowledge or acquaintance with the experience.
Mistake: Saying that refuting functionalism proves property dualism
Why this is incorrect:Showing that functional facts are insufficient would not by itself establish that qualia are non-physical.
How to improve:Keep the conclusion proportionate to the argument.
Exam-Style Questions ✍️
Question 1
What is Block's China thought experiment?(3 marks)
Question 2
What is meant by a functional duplicate with no mentality or qualia?(3 marks)
Question 3
Explain why Block's China creates a problem for functionalism.(5 marks)
Question 4
Explain how the Knowledge/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts.(5 marks)
Question 5
Mary knows every fact about the functional relationships involved in human colour vision but has never experienced colour.
Explain how her first colour experience could be used to challenge functionalism.(5 marks)
Question 6
Explain the difference between the inverted qualia objection and Block's China objection.(12 marks)
Question 7
Explain and compare Block's China and the Knowledge/Mary argument as objections to functionalism.(12 marks)
Question 8
Can functional facts fully explain qualia?(25 marks)
Indicative Answers and Marking Guidance
Question 1
Ned Block's China thought experiment imagines the population of China using two-way radios to duplicate the functions of a brain.
The system therefore possesses the relevant functional organisation.
Functionalism appears committed to saying that this system would have mental states, including qualia.
Block argues that if we reject this highly counterintuitive conclusion, we have reason to reject functionalism.
Question 2
A functional duplicate has states that play the same functional roles as those of another system.
A functional duplicate without mentality or qualia would therefore reproduce the relevant causal organisation while lacking conscious mental states.
If such a system is possible, functional organisation is not sufficient for mentality.
Question 3
Functionalism claims that mental states can be characterised through their functional roles.
The China system is stipulated to duplicate the relevant functions of a brain.
Functionalism therefore appears committed to saying that the system possesses the corresponding mental states.
However, it may seem highly counterintuitive to claim that the system as a whole has qualia.
If the functional organisation could exist without mentality, functional roles are not sufficient to explain mental states and functionalism is undermined.
Question 4
The original Knowledge/Mary argument asks whether complete physical knowledge captures phenomenal experience.
Applied to functionalism, Mary is instead imagined to know all the functional facts concerning colour vision.
She understands every relevant causal relationship involving environmental inputs, internal states and behavioural outputs.
However, when she experiences colour for the first time, she appears to learn what colour experience is like.
If she gains new propositional knowledge, complete functional knowledge was incomplete.
This suggests that no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia.
Question 5
Before experiencing colour, Mary knows every functional fact about colour vision.
If functionalism provides a complete account of mental states, this should include everything relevant to colour experience.
However, when Mary first sees colour, she apparently discovers what the experience is like.
If this is genuinely new propositional knowledge, there was a fact about the phenomenal character of colour experience that was absent from her complete functional knowledge.
Functional facts would therefore be insufficient to explain qualia.
The functionalist can respond that Mary gains an ability or acquaintance rather than a new fact.
Question 6
Both objections involve functional duplicates but challenge functionalism differently.
Inverted qualia proposes two functionally indistinguishable subjects whose qualia are systematically different.
Its structure is:
same function + different qualia
This challenges the idea that functional organisation determines which phenomenal properties occur.
Block's China proposes a system that duplicates the functions of a brain but may lack mentality or qualia altogether.
Its structure is:
same function + no qualia
This challenges the stronger claim that functional organisation is sufficient for any mentality at all.
Both objections therefore suggest that phenomenal properties may not be determined by functional facts, but they do so in different ways.
Question 7
Block's China and Mary both challenge the claim that functional facts provide a complete account of mentality.
Block imagines the population of China using two-way radios to duplicate the functions of a brain. Functionalism appears committed to saying that the resulting system possesses mental states and qualia. If it is possible for the system to have the functional organisation without consciousness, functional organisation is insufficient for mentality.
Mary attacks functionalism through knowledge. If Mary knows every functional fact about colour vision but still learns something when she first experiences colour, complete functional knowledge did not include everything about qualia.
The arguments therefore have different forms:
China: functional organisation without experience
Mary: knowledge of functional organisation without knowledge of experience
Both focus on the apparent gap between function and phenomenal consciousness.
A strong evaluation should also recognise possible responses. The functionalist can accept that a genuine China functional duplicate would be conscious, and can argue that Mary gains an ability or acquaintance rather than a new propositional fact.
Question 8
A successful 25-mark response should explain functionalism and evaluate the full range of specified qualia objections.
Relevant material includes:
functionalism
functional roles
environmental inputs
internal states
behavioural outputs
multiple realisability
functional duplicates
Inverted Qualia [Inverted Qualia]
same functional organisation with different qualia
Ned Block's China thought experiment
the population of China using two-way radios to duplicate the functions of the brain
the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality or qualia
whether the China conclusion is genuinely impossible or merely counterintuitive
Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument [Jackson's Knowledge/Mary Argument]
Mary knowing all functional facts
whether she gains new knowledge when she experiences colour
the distinction between functional facts and phenomenal properties
ability knowledge
acquaintance knowledge
whether Mary's new experience amounts to a new propositional fact
the claim that no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia
the relationship between conceivability and genuine possibility
the fact that rejecting functionalism does not automatically establish property dualism
a reasoned overall judgement
A strong conclusion should bring all three specified challenges together. Inverted qualia suggests that identical function could accompany different qualia. Block's China suggests that identical functional organisation could exist without qualia at all. Mary suggests that complete knowledge of functional facts could still leave phenomenal experience unknown. If these possibilities are genuine, functionalism cannot fully explain qualia. However, the functionalist can challenge the intuitions on which each argument depends, particularly by denying that genuine functional duplication can come apart from mentality and by denying that Mary acquires a new propositional fact.
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