Eliminative Materialism | AQA A-Level Philosophy
For Specification 7172
AQA A-Level Philosophy | Free Revision Notes
Estimated study time: 55 to 65 minutes
This Eliminative Materialism A-Level Philosophy revision lesson examines a radical physicalist theory defended by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland. Eliminative materialism claims that some or all of the common-sense mental states used in folk psychology, such as beliefs, do not exist and that our ordinary understanding of the mind is radically mistaken. Unlike Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory], eliminativism does not simply reduce familiar mental states to physical states. It argues that mature neuroscience may replace these common-sense concepts altogether.
Learning Objectives 🎯
By the end of this revision page, you should be able to:
Explain eliminative materialism.
Explain the concept of folk psychology.
Explain Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland's rejection of some or all common-sense mental states.
Explain why eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory.
Distinguish eliminativism from reductive physicalism.
Distinguish eliminating a mental-state concept from reducing it to a physical state.
Revision Notes 📚
Eliminative Materialism A-Level Philosophy Revision: the central claim
Eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory.
It claims that:
Some or all common-sense, or folk-psychological, mental states and properties do not exist, and our common-sense understanding of them is radically mistaken.
AQA identifies Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland as defenders of this position.
The theory is therefore more radical than simply saying:
mental states are physical.
Instead, it questions whether some of the mental states that ordinary people assume exist should be accepted at all.
The importance of "some or all"
The wording some or all matters.
Eliminative materialism does not have to claim:
every mental state or mental property is unreal.
The theory allows the claim that some common-sense mental categories should be eliminated.
A more radical version can claim that all the relevant folk-psychological mental states should be rejected.
Do not exaggerate the theory into one single claim that absolutely everything we call "mental" must be denied.
The specified position is:
some or all common-sense mental states or properties do not exist.
What does "materialism" mean here?
Eliminative materialism belongs to the broader family of theories introduced in Physicalism and Philosophical Behaviourism [Physicalism and Philosophical Behaviourism].
Physicalism holds that everything that exists is physical or reducible to the physical.
Within philosophy of mind, physicalist theories reject genuinely non-physical mental substances or properties.
However, physicalists can disagree about what to do with our ordinary concepts of mental states.
Some say:
mental states can be fully explained or reduced in physical terms.
Eliminative materialists instead argue:
some ordinary mental-state concepts should disappear from an advanced physical theory of the mind.
What Is Folk Psychology?
The central definition
Folk psychology is our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind.
It assumes the existence of internal mental states that we use to explain and predict behaviour.
Examples of the kinds of concepts involved include:
beliefs
other common-sense mental states used to explain behaviour
The key idea is that ordinary people commonly interpret behaviour by referring to internal psychological states.
Explaining behaviour through mental states
Folk psychology assumes that people's actions can be understood by appealing to what is happening mentally.
For example, behaviour may be explained by referring to a person's:
beliefs
other internal mental states
The theory therefore assumes that these mental categories genuinely correspond to states that people possess.
Eliminative materialism challenges this assumption.
Predicting behaviour
Folk psychology is also used to predict behaviour.
If we attribute a particular mental state to someone, we may use that attribution to anticipate what they will do.
So folk psychology has two connected roles:
mental states → explaining behaviour
and:
mental states → predicting behaviour
The eliminative materialist questions whether the mental-state categories used in this common-sense framework genuinely describe the mind.
Folk psychology as a theory
The eliminative materialist treats folk psychology as a pre-scientific theory of mind.
This is important.
Our ordinary way of talking about mental states is not automatically treated as an infallible description of reality.
Instead, it is understood as a way of explaining and predicting behaviour that can be assessed like a theory.
According to the eliminative materialist critique:
folk psychology may eventually be superseded by a mature neuroscience.
What would "superseded" mean?
If folk psychology were superseded, an advanced scientific understanding of the brain would no longer need at least some of the common-sense mental concepts we currently use.
The eliminative materialist therefore expects a mature neuroscience to replace parts, or perhaps all, of our ordinary folk-psychological account.
This is stronger than simply improving our descriptions of familiar mental states.
The theory allows those familiar categories themselves to be abandoned.
Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland
Their role in the specification
AQA identifies Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland as defenders of eliminative materialism.
The relevant claim is that:
some or all common-sense folk-psychological mental states or properties do not exist.
Our ordinary understanding of those states is therefore radically mistaken.
The rejection of common-sense mental states
Consider an intentional mental state such as:
belief
Ordinary folk psychology assumes that beliefs are genuine internal mental states that can be used to explain behaviour.
Eliminative materialism challenges this.
Its radical claim is not:
"Beliefs exist, but we have misunderstood one or two of their features."
Instead, it allows the conclusion:
The folk-psychological category of belief itself does not correspond to a genuine state of the kind common sense assumes.
This illustrates why the theory is described as eliminative.
Why the theory is radical
Earlier physicalist theories retain familiar mental-state concepts.
For example:
philosophical behaviourism retains mental-state language but analyses it behaviourally
mind-brain type identity theory retains mental states but identifies their types with brain-state types
Eliminative materialism is different.
It says that our common-sense classification of some or all mental states may simply be wrong.
The relevant categories should therefore be eliminated, rather than translated or identified with something physical.
Folk Psychology and Mature Neuroscience
Two competing pictures
The contrast can be expressed as:
Folk psychology
The mind contains familiar internal mental states that explain and predict behaviour.
Eliminative materialism
Our common-sense mental categories may be radically mistaken and may be replaced by a mature neuroscience.
The disagreement therefore concerns which concepts belong in an adequate account of the mind.
The role of neuroscience
AQA's subject-specific vocabulary says that, according to the eliminative materialist critique, folk psychology is a pre-scientific theory that will be superseded by a mature neuroscience.
The proposed future physical account would therefore explain the mind using the categories supported by developed brain science rather than assuming that ordinary common-sense mental categories must be preserved.
What eliminativism does not claim
Eliminative materialism should not be simplified into:
"Nothing happens in the brain."
It is a physicalist theory.
It expects physical brain science to provide the relevant account.
The radical claim concerns whether our ordinary folk-psychological descriptions correctly identify the states that actually exist.
Eliminative Materialism and Reductive Physicalism
The central distinction
This is one of the most important parts of the lesson.
Both eliminative materialism and reductive physicalism are physicalist.
However, they treat familiar mental states differently.
Reductive physicalism
A reductive physicalist claims that mental states exist but can ultimately be fully explained in physical terms.
The strategy is:
retain the mental state + reduce it to the physical
For example, Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory] claims an ontological reduction:
types of mental state are identical with types of brain state.
The mental state is retained but explained as physical.
Eliminative materialism
The eliminative materialist takes a different route.
The strategy is:
reject some or all folk-psychological mental states + replace the mistaken framework
The claim is not simply that a familiar mental state turns out to be physical.
Instead, at least some familiar mental-state categories may not correspond to anything that actually exists.
Reduction versus elimination
The difference can be represented clearly:
Reductive physicalism | Eliminative materialism |
Retains the relevant mental state | Rejects some or all folk-psychological mental states |
Claims it can be explained or reduced physically | Claims common-sense understanding is radically mistaken |
"Mental state X is really physical state Y" | "The supposed mental state X does not exist as folk psychology describes it" |
Reduction | Elimination |
Example: mind-brain type identity theory | Defended by Patricia and Paul Churchland |
This is the distinction you need to express accurately in an exam.
Why elimination is not reduction
Suppose a theory claims:
X exists, and X is really Y.
That is a form of reduction.
But suppose a theory claims:
X does not actually exist, so a mature theory should stop using the concept X.
That is elimination.
Mind-brain type identity theory takes the first approach.
Eliminative materialism takes the second approach towards at least some folk-psychological categories.
Eliminativism and ontological reduction
Recall from Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory] that ontological reduction says two apparently different phenomena are actually the same type of phenomenon.
Identity theory can therefore say:
mental-state type M exists
and:
M is really brain-state type B.
The eliminativist may instead say:
the folk-psychological mental state M, as ordinarily understood, does not exist.
There is then nothing of that folk-psychological kind to identify with B.
This is why the theories should not be confused.
Eliminativism and Philosophical Behaviourism
Philosophical behaviourism also retains mental-state language.
Hempel attempts to analytically reduce propositions about mental states to propositions about bodily behaviour.
Ryle analyses mental-state propositions through behavioural dispositions.
Eliminative materialism is more radical.
It does not simply ask:
How can the proposition "S believes P" be translated into physical or behavioural terms?
It can challenge the prior assumption:
Does the common-sense state called a "belief" actually exist in the way folk psychology assumes?
That difference is fundamental.
Three physicalist strategies
The physicalist theories studied so far can therefore be contrasted:
Philosophical behaviourism
Analyse mental-state language behaviourally.
Mind-brain type identity theory
Identify mental-state types with brain-state types.
Eliminative materialism
Reject some or all common-sense mental-state categories as radically mistaken.
This comparison prepares you for Comparing Physicalist Theories [Comparing Physicalist Theories].
Does Eliminative Materialism Deny the Physical Brain?
No.
The theory is materialist or physicalist.
Its claim is not that there are no physical processes responsible for human behaviour.
Instead, it questions whether the common-sense psychological categories we use to describe those processes correspond to genuine states.
A mature neuroscience is expected to provide the physical account.
Does it deny every mental-state concept?
Not necessarily.
Remember the specification wording:
some or all
An answer claiming that eliminative materialism must deny every mental state would therefore be too strong.
The position can vary in how extensively it proposes eliminating folk-psychological categories.
Why Folk Psychology Is Central
It is impossible to understand eliminative materialism properly without understanding folk psychology.
Eliminativism is not simply the claim:
"The brain matters."
All physicalist theories can accept the importance of the physical.
The distinctive eliminativist claim is:
Our ordinary common-sense theory of internal mental states may be radically mistaken.
This is why the theory focuses on the fate of categories such as beliefs rather than merely on whether mental life has a physical basis.
The Theory in Four Steps
A useful summary is:
Folk psychology is our common-sense understanding of the mind.
It assumes internal mental states that are used to explain and predict behaviour.
Eliminative materialism claims that some or all of these folk-psychological states or properties do not exist and that the common-sense theory is radically mistaken.
A mature neuroscience is expected to supersede this pre-scientific framework.
This distinguishes eliminative materialism from reductive physicalism.
The reductive physicalist says:
retain and physically explain
The eliminativist says:
eliminate and replace
Looking Ahead to the Problems
The next lesson, Problems for Eliminative Materialism [Problems for Eliminative Materialism], examines the specified challenges to this radical theory.
These concern:
our certainty about the existence of our mental states
the predictive and explanatory power of folk psychology
the claim that eliminative materialism is self-refuting
For this lesson, the priority is to understand the theory itself and how it differs from other forms of physicalism.
What You Need to Be Able to Do in an Examination
For this topic, you should be able to:
define eliminative materialism
state that it is a physicalist theory
preserve the qualification some or all
explain what folk psychology is
explain the role of internal mental states within folk psychology
explain how folk psychology is used to explain and predict behaviour
explain why eliminative materialists regard folk psychology as a pre-scientific theory
identify Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland as defenders of eliminative materialism
explain the claim that mature neuroscience will supersede folk psychology
distinguish elimination from reduction
distinguish eliminative materialism from Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory]
distinguish eliminative materialism from Physicalism and Philosophical Behaviourism [Physicalism and Philosophical Behaviourism]
The central contrast to remember is:
Reductive physicalism: familiar mental states exist but are physically reducible.
Eliminative materialism: some or all familiar folk-psychological mental states do not exist as common sense supposes.
Key Words 🔑
Key word | Student-friendly definition | How it may be used in an exam |
Eliminative materialism | The physicalist theory that some or all common-sense folk-psychological mental states or properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken. | Define the theory precisely and preserve the phrase "some or all". |
Folk psychology | The ordinary common-sense understanding of the mind that assumes internal mental states and uses them to explain and predict behaviour. | Explain what eliminative materialism proposes to replace. |
Physicalism | The theory that everything that exists is physical or reducible to the physical. | Explain the broader metaphysical position within which eliminative materialism sits. |
Reduction | The approach of retaining a phenomenon while explaining it in terms of another, such as physically reducing mental states. | Distinguish reductive physicalism from elimination. |
Mature neuroscience | The advanced scientific account of the brain that eliminative materialists expect to supersede folk psychology. | Explain what is proposed to replace the common-sense theory of mind. |
Hints from the Examiner Reports 💡
No lesson-specific examiner guidance was identified in the provided reports.
Common Mistakes ⚠️
Mistake: Saying eliminative materialism reduces beliefs to brain states
Why this is incorrect:That describes a reductive strategy more closely associated with theories such as mind-brain type identity theory.
How to improve:State that eliminative materialism claims some or all folk-psychological mental states do not exist as common sense supposes.
Mistake: Saying eliminative materialism necessarily denies every mental state
Why this is incorrect:AQA specifies some or all common-sense mental states or properties.
How to improve:Use the qualification exactly and avoid overstating the theory.
Mistake: Defining folk psychology as scientific psychology
Why this is incorrect:Folk psychology is the ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind.
How to improve:Explain that it assumes internal mental states and uses them to explain and predict behaviour.
Mistake: Saying eliminative materialism is dualist
Why this is incorrect:Eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory.
How to improve:Explain that it expects a mature physical account of the mind, rather than accepting non-physical mental substances or properties.
Mistake: Treating elimination and reduction as the same thing
Why this is incorrect:A reductive theory retains the phenomenon and identifies or explains it physically. Eliminativism rejects some or all of the common-sense categories themselves.
How to improve:Remember:
reduction = retain and explain
elimination = reject and replace
Exam-Style Questions ✍️
Question 1
Define eliminative materialism.(3 marks)
Question 2
What is folk psychology?(3 marks)
Question 3
Explain why eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory.(5 marks)
Question 4
Explain Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland's eliminativist position concerning common-sense mental states.(5 marks)
Question 5
A student writes:
"Eliminative materialism says beliefs exist but are really particular brain states."
Explain why this confuses eliminative materialism with reductive physicalism.(5 marks)
Question 6
Explain the claim that folk psychology may be superseded by a mature neuroscience.(5 marks)
Question 7
Explain and distinguish eliminative materialism and mind-brain type identity theory.(12 marks)
Question 8
Is eliminating folk-psychological mental states importantly different from reducing them to physical states?(25 marks)
Indicative Answers and Marking Guidance
Question 1
Eliminative materialism is the physicalist theory that some or all common-sense folk-psychological mental states or properties do not exist and that our common-sense understanding of them is radically mistaken.
An accurate answer should preserve the qualification some or all.
Question 2
Folk psychology is our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind.
It assumes the existence of internal mental states which people use to:
explain behaviour
predict behaviour
Eliminative materialists regard this as a pre-scientific theory of mind.
Question 3
Eliminative materialism is physicalist because it rejects the need for genuinely non-physical mental substances or properties.
However, unlike reductive forms of physicalism, it does not necessarily preserve familiar common-sense mental categories.
It claims that some or all folk-psychological states may not exist and that a mature neuroscience will supersede the pre-scientific framework in which those concepts are used.
Question 4
Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland defend the claim that some or all of the mental states and properties assumed by ordinary folk psychology do not exist.
Folk psychology treats internal states, such as beliefs, as genuine states used to explain and predict behaviour.
The eliminative materialist argues that this common-sense understanding may be radically mistaken.
Instead of assuming that mature science must preserve these familiar categories, eliminativism allows that a developed neuroscience may replace them.
Question 5
The statement describes reduction, not elimination.
Mind-brain type identity theory retains mental states and claims that types of mental state are ontologically identical to types of brain state.
Eliminative materialism instead argues that some or all folk-psychological mental states do not exist as common sense supposes.
The distinction is therefore:
Reduction: X exists, but X is physically reducible.
Elimination: the supposed X should not be retained in an adequate theory.
Question 6
Folk psychology is an ordinary, common-sense theory that assumes internal mental states and uses them to explain and predict behaviour.
The eliminative materialist regards this framework as pre-scientific.
The claim that it will be superseded means that a mature neuroscience may explain the mind and behaviour using a more accurate physical framework in which some or all familiar folk-psychological categories are no longer required.
This is why eliminative materialism proposes replacement rather than merely refinement of folk psychology.
Question 7
Both eliminative materialism and Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory] are physicalist theories, but they treat familiar mental states differently.
Mind-brain type identity theory is reductive. It claims that types of mental state exist but are ontologically identical to types of brain state.
Eliminative materialism instead claims that some or all common-sense folk-psychological mental states or properties do not exist, and that our ordinary understanding of them is radically mistaken.
Identity theory therefore says:
mental-state type = physical brain-state type
Eliminativism says:
some folk-psychological mental-state categories should be eliminated rather than identified with physical states
The distinction is between reduction and elimination.
Question 8
A successful 25-mark response should focus closely on the distinction between preserving a mental category and rejecting it.
Relevant material includes:
physicalism
folk psychology
internal mental states
explanation and prediction of behaviour
folk psychology as a pre-scientific theory of mind
Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland
the claim that some or all folk-psychological mental states do not exist
the claim that common-sense understanding is radically mistaken
mature neuroscience
reductive physicalism
Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory [Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory]
ontological reduction
the difference between identifying a mental state with a physical state and eliminating the mental-state category
the contrast between retaining and replacing common-sense concepts
the fact that both approaches remain physicalist
A strong answer will keep the central distinction precise. A reductive physicalist argues that familiar mental states can be retained because they are ultimately physical. The eliminative materialist makes the more radical claim that at least some of those familiar folk-psychological categories should not be retained at all because our common-sense theory of mind is fundamentally mistaken.
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