Lesson 123. Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 | OCR A-Level Law
For Specification H418
OCR A-Level Law | Free Revision Notes
Estimated study time: 40 minutes
This Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 A-Level Law revision page examines the duty an occupier may owe to a trespasser or other non-lawful visitor. OCR requires you to define a trespasser, explain when the statutory duty arises and determine whether that duty has been breached. The key provisions are s1(3), which sets three conditions for the existence of the duty, and s1(4), which sets the standard of reasonable care. The 1984 Act must be kept separate from the rules governing lawful visitors under the 1957 Act.
Learning Objectives 🎯
By the end of this revision page, you should be able to:
Define a trespasser for the purposes of occupiers’ liability.
Explain how a lawful visitor can become a trespasser by exceeding their permission.
Explain the three requirements in s1(3) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984.
Explain the duty imposed by s1(4).
Apply relevant circumstances, including obvious risks and practical precautions, when deciding whether the occupier must offer protection.
Reach supported conclusions about whether a duty exists and whether it has been breached.
Revision Notes 📚
When does the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 apply?
OCR divides occupiers’ liability between:
the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 for lawful visitors
the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 for trespassers or other non-lawful visitors.
The first question in a problem is therefore:
Is C a lawful visitor or a trespasser?
If C is lawfully on the premises, begin with lawful visitors and the common duty [Lesson 121. Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957].
If C is a trespasser, the 1984 Act may apply.
Why is there a duty towards trespassers?
The 1984 Act recognises that an occupier may sometimes owe a duty even to somebody who has entered without permission.
OCR's 2022 materials link the development of this duty with the concept of common humanity, associated with Herrington v British Railways Board.
However, the duty owed to trespassers is more restricted than the common duty owed to lawful visitors.
A trespasser does not automatically receive protection simply because they are injured on somebody else's premises.
The claimant must satisfy the statutory requirements.
What is a trespasser?
Common-law definition
The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 does not provide its own complete definition of a trespasser, so OCR uses the common-law approach.
Addie v Dumbreck is identified as the relevant authority.
In student-friendly terms, a trespasser is someone who enters or remains on land without the occupier's permission, where their presence is either unknown to the occupier or, if known, is objected to.
The essential idea is:
No permission = potential trespasser
However, status must be considered carefully because someone can begin as a lawful visitor and later become a trespasser.
A deliberate trespasser
A person who knowingly ignores the occupier's permission and enters private premises may clearly be a trespasser.
For example:
A sign states that woodland is private and closed to the public. C deliberately ignores it and enters to collect something from the land.
C has no permission to enter and may therefore be treated as a trespasser.
OCR's 2023 examination used a similar scenario involving Felix entering private woodland to collect birds' eggs. His status as a trespasser was expressly treated as undisputed.
A trespasser does not have to be a burglar
Do not assume that the term trespasser refers only to someone committing a serious criminal act.
OCR's evaluative materials recognise that a trespasser could range from someone deliberately entering private land to someone who strays onto land without permission.
For occupiers’ liability, the important question is the person's permission to be on the premises, not whether their conduct fits a particular criminal label.
A lawful visitor can become a trespasser
This is one of the most important status rules.
Someone may enter premises lawfully but then go beyond the scope of their permission.
OCR identifies The Calgarth as authority for the principle that a lawful visitor can become a trespasser when they exceed that permission.
This means you must ask:
Where was C permitted to go?
What was C permitted to do?
Did C remain within those limits?
Example: exceeding permission
Bilal is a paying guest at a hotel.
He therefore begins as a lawful visitor.
However, he opens a door leading to an area which he knows he is not permitted to enter and continues inside.
His original lawful status does not necessarily continue.
OCR's specimen assessment used this structure and treated Bilal as becoming a trespasser when he knowingly went beyond his permission.
The applicable law therefore changed from:
OLA 1957 → OLA 1984
Status can depend on location and purpose
Do not simply ask:
“Was C invited onto the property?”
Ask:
Was C permitted to be in this particular place, doing this particular thing?
A hotel guest can be lawful in:
their room
reception
authorised communal areas
but potentially trespassing in an area they know is prohibited.
This is why status should be established before applying either Act.
The scope of the 1984 Act
OCR's 2023 mark scheme identifies s1(1)(a) as covering injury caused by a danger due to the state of the premises.
The 1984 Act therefore focuses on the danger presented by the premises for the non-lawful visitor.
OCR's 2023 materials also highlight that the nature of the premises can be highly significant when considering whether protection should reasonably be offered.
For example, ordinary natural features are not automatically treated as dangerous simply because a trespasser chooses to undertake a risky activity on them.
Personal injury, not property damage
OCR's 2022 mark scheme identifies an important limit on the scope of liability under the 1984 Act: protection is directed towards personal injury rather than damage to the trespasser's property.
This provides another difference from the broader forms of loss which may arise elsewhere in tort.
For this lesson, concentrate primarily on personal injury suffered because of the relevant danger.
Section 1(3): when does the occupier owe a duty?
The statutory duty does not arise automatically whenever a trespasser enters premises.
Section 1(3) sets three requirements.
All three need to be considered.
A useful memory structure is:
Danger → Trespasser nearby → Reasonable protection
More precisely:
s1(3)(a)
D is aware of the danger, or has reasonable grounds to believe that it exists.
s1(3)(b)
D knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that C is in the vicinity of the danger, or may come into its vicinity.
s1(3)(c)
The risk is one against which, in all the circumstances, D may reasonably be expected to offer some protection.
These requirements must be kept separate.
OCR's 2023 examiner report specifically noted that weaker candidates often confused or merged s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b).
Section 1(3)(a): awareness of the danger
The first question is about the danger itself.
Ask:
Does D know about the danger, or have reasonable grounds to believe that it exists?
OCR identifies Rhind v Astbury Water Park in connection with this requirement.
This requirement prevents liability being imposed simply because a danger happened to exist.
There must be the required level of awareness or reasonable grounds for awareness.
Apply the facts to the danger
Useful factual clues may include:
D has previously inspected the area
D has received complaints
D has seen the defect
D has taken earlier precautions
D regularly patrols the land
D has information showing the danger exists.
Do not merely write:
“D knew there was danger.”
Identify how the facts demonstrate that knowledge.
Worked example: s1(3)(a)
Harper owns land containing an abandoned structure with rotten flooring. Harper has personally inspected the structure and knows that several floorboards have collapsed.
The requirement is strongly supported because Harper is directly aware of the danger.
If Harper had no knowledge and no reasonable basis for discovering the danger, the conclusion might be different.
Section 1(3)(b): awareness of the trespasser
The second requirement is different.
It concerns D's knowledge that a trespasser is or may come into the vicinity of the danger.
Ask:
Does D know, or have reasonable grounds to believe, that trespassers may be near this danger?
OCR identifies:
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties
Swain v Natui Ram Puri
as relevant authorities.
You do not need D to know C personally
The issue is not necessarily whether D knew:
“Felix himself will arrive at 11.15 pm.”
Instead, the question is whether D knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that a trespasser might come into the vicinity of the danger.
Evidence may include:
repeated past trespassing
damage showing people have entered
social media evidence
reports from neighbours
D's own patrols
previous encounters.
OCR example: Felix in the woodland
In the 2023 paper, Henry knew that people had previously trespassed into his woodland to climb trees and steal birds' eggs.
OCR's mark scheme found strong evidence for s1(3)(b) because Henry:
knew of previous activity
had seen information on social media
carried out regular patrols.
Therefore, even though Henry did not know precisely when Felix would enter, there were strong grounds for believing that trespassers might be in the vicinity.
Do not merge danger and trespasser awareness
Remember:
s1(3)(a)
Does D know about the danger?
s1(3)(b)
Does D know trespassers may be near the danger?
A strong answer deals with each separately.
Section 1(3)(c): should protection reasonably be offered?
The third requirement is often the most evaluative part of the duty analysis.
Ask:
Is this a risk against which D may reasonably be expected to offer C some protection?
OCR identifies Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and Simonds v Isle of Wight Council as relevant authorities.
This requirement introduces the circumstances of the particular case.
Even if:
D knows of the danger
D expects trespassers nearby
it does not automatically follow that a duty is owed.
Why s1(3)(c) matters
The law does not require occupiers to remove or guard against every danger on all land simply because somebody might trespass.
The court considers whether it is reasonable to expect some protection.
Relevant considerations identified in OCR materials include:
the nature of the premises
practicality of precautions
the degree of danger
the trespasser's age
whether the risk is obvious
whether C is engaging in a foolhardy activity
whether C's expertise or training should make the danger apparent.
These are highly useful when applying s1(3)(c).
The nature of the premises
The character of the premises can influence what protection is reasonable.
OCR identifies Rhind v Astbury Water Park in relation to the nature of the premises.
Ask:
Is this a building with a specific hidden defect?
Is this a large area of countryside?
Is the alleged danger simply a natural feature?
How realistic is it to control the entire area?
The nature and size of the premises can make some precautions more reasonable than others.
Natural features and ordinary premises
OCR's 2023 woodland question illustrates this particularly clearly.
The mark scheme recognised that the trees themselves were not inherently defective or dangerous simply because Felix chose to climb one at night.
This is an important distinction:
A risky activity carried out by C is not necessarily the same as a danger created by the state of D's premises.
The source of the danger should therefore be identified precisely.
Practicality of precautions
The court may consider how practical it would be for D to protect trespassers.
OCR identifies Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council as particularly relevant.
Ask:
Could the danger easily be secured?
Could access be prevented?
Would protection require enormous expense or effort?
How large is the area?
Would the suggested precaution actually be realistic?
Easy precautions
If the danger could be addressed by a straightforward measure, that may support imposing a duty.
OCR's specimen hotel problem involved an unlocked door giving access to a dangerous empty swimming pool.
The mark scheme reasoned that the hotel could easily have offered protection by locking the door.
This supported s1(3)(c).
Impractical precautions
By contrast, the 2023 woodland problem involved a huge area containing many trees.
OCR accepted that it would be unreasonable to expect Henry to:
fence off the entire woodland
make every tree impossible to climb.
The practicality of precautions therefore weighed strongly against a duty.
💡 Exam technique: Avoid simply proposing an ideal safety measure. Ask whether it is reasonable in the circumstances.
Degree of danger
The seriousness of the danger is also relevant.
OCR identifies Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust in relation to the degree of danger and the age of the trespasser.
The more serious a genuine premises danger is, the stronger the argument may be that some protection should reasonably be offered.
However, seriousness alone does not automatically create a duty.
It must be considered with the other s1(3) requirements.
The age of the trespasser
Age can also affect what protection is reasonably expected.
A young trespasser may have a different appreciation of danger from a capable adult.
OCR identifies Keown as relevant to this consideration.
However, keep the 1984 Act rules separate from the specific child-visitor provisions in the 1957 Act.
OCR's 2022 examiner report noted that some candidates incorrectly transferred concepts between the two Acts, particularly around children and allurements.
⚠️ Do not automatically apply s2(3)(a) of the 1957 Act to a trespasser.
You are applying the 1984 Act.
Obvious risks
An occupier is not necessarily required to protect an adult trespasser from an obvious risk which the trespasser knowingly chooses to take.
OCR's 2023 materials identify:
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties
Young v Kent County Council
as relevant authorities.
The key principle is:
A trespasser who knowingly takes an obvious danger cannot automatically complain that D failed to prevent that risk-taking.
This reflects an important idea of personal responsibility.
OCR example: climbing a tall tree at night
Felix was:
34 years old
deliberately trespassing
climbing a very tall tree
doing so at night.
OCR's 2023 mark scheme treated this as an obvious and dangerous risk.
This strongly supported the conclusion that Henry could not reasonably be expected to protect Felix from his own decision to climb the tree in darkness.
Foolhardy pursuits
OCR also recognises that the occupier may expect a trespasser not to engage in an obviously foolhardy pursuit.
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties is identified as relevant authority.
This does not mean that any poor decision by C automatically destroys the duty.
Instead, it is one consideration when deciding whether D could reasonably be expected to offer protection under s1(3)(c).
Expertise and training
A trespasser's own expertise may also matter.
If C has knowledge or training which should make the danger obvious, it may be less reasonable to expect D to protect them from deliberately taking that danger.
OCR's 2023 mark scheme used Felix's experience as a bird egg collector as potentially relevant because it could suggest familiarity with climbing trees to reach nests.
This forms part of the wider question:
How reasonable is it to expect D to protect this particular trespasser from this particular risk?
The three requirements together
Do not treat s1(3) as one vague fairness question.
Use three separate headings or stages.
Requirement | Question |
s1(3)(a) | Does D know about the danger or have reasonable grounds to believe it exists? |
s1(3)(b) | Does D know or have reasonable grounds to believe that trespassers may be in its vicinity? |
s1(3)(c) | Is it a risk against which D may reasonably be expected to offer some protection? |
Only when the statutory requirements are satisfied does the occupier owe the relevant duty.
Section 1(4): what duty is owed?
Once s1(3) is satisfied, s1(4) explains the scope of the duty.
OCR's mark schemes state that D must:
take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that the trespasser does not suffer injury on the premises because of the danger concerned.
The standard is therefore objective and reasonable.
It is not a guarantee of absolute safety.
Section 1(3) and s1(4) are different
This distinction is vital.
Section 1(3)
Asks:
Does D owe C a duty at all?
Section 1(4)
Asks:
If the duty exists, what level of care must D take?
Do not merge them.
A strong answer first establishes the duty under s1(3) and then considers whether D has met the reasonable standard in s1(4).
When is the duty breached?
Once the s1(3) duty exists, breach occurs where D fails to take the reasonable care required in all the circumstances to protect C from injury caused by the relevant danger.
OCR identifies relevant considerations including:
the nature of the premises
practicality of precautions
degree of danger
age of the trespasser.
The same factual circumstances that help determine whether protection should be offered under s1(3)(c) can therefore be highly relevant to the practical standard required.
A breach analysis
Use:
What is the danger?
What does D know about it?
What protection can reasonably be expected?
How serious is the risk?
How practical are the precautions?
What did D actually do?
Did D take reasonable care in all the circumstances?
Then conclude.
Reasonable care, not complete protection
The duty under s1(4) does not require D to make trespassing impossible.
For example, it may be unrealistic to expect an occupier to:
fence an entire area of countryside
prevent access to every tree
eliminate every natural hazard.
This was central to OCR's 2023 application of Tomlinson to Henry's woodland.
The word reasonable must therefore remain at the heart of the analysis.
Worked example 1: duty likely to arise
Westlake Hotel has an indoor swimming pool. The pool is drained for maintenance and the room is kept in darkness. The hotel knows that guests sometimes enter restricted areas. The door to the pool is left unlocked.
Assume a guest exceeds their permission and becomes a trespasser.
s1(3)(a)
The hotel knows the empty pool in darkness presents a danger.
s1(3)(b)
If the hotel knows guests may enter the area, there are reasonable grounds to believe trespassers may come into the vicinity.
s1(3)(c)
Protection is straightforward. Locking the door would prevent access to the dangerous area.
It is therefore reasonable to expect some protection.
s1(4)
If the hotel simply leaves the dangerous room accessible despite those circumstances, it may fail to take reasonable care.
Conclusion
A duty is likely to arise and breach may be established.
This reflects the structure of OCR's specimen Bilal scenario.
Worked example 2: duty unlikely to arise
Henry owns a large woodland. He knows that adult trespassers sometimes enter at night and climb trees to collect birds' eggs. Felix deliberately enters, climbs a very tall tree in darkness and falls.
This mirrors OCR's 2023 examination scenario.
s1(3)(a)
Henry is aware of the potential danger.
s1(3)(b)
Henry also knows trespassers may be in the woodland because of:
previous incidents
social media
his routine patrols.
s1(3)(c)
This is the key issue.
Factors against expecting protection include:
fencing the entire woodland would be impractical
making every tree impossible to climb would be unrealistic
a tree is not necessarily a defective premises danger in itself
climbing a tall tree at night is an obvious danger
Felix is an adult
his egg-collecting experience may make him particularly aware of the risk.
Conclusion
Although s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b) appear satisfied, s1(3)(c) is not.
Henry therefore does not owe Felix the statutory duty.
This is the conclusion reached in the OCR mark scheme.
Worked example 3: hidden danger and easy precaution
Riverside Ltd controls an abandoned building. It knows that trespassers regularly enter through a broken gate. A section of floor immediately inside has collapsed into a deep basement, but the hole is difficult to see in the darkness. The gate can be secured easily.
s1(3)(a)
Riverside knows of the collapsed floor.
s1(3)(b)
It knows trespassers regularly enter through the gate and may therefore be in the vicinity.
s1(3)(c)
The risk is serious and not obvious in darkness. Securing the gate is also straightforward.
This supports the conclusion that Riverside may reasonably be expected to provide some protection.
s1(4)
If Riverside does nothing despite the known hidden danger and easy precaution, it may have failed to take reasonable care in all the circumstances.
Conclusion
A duty and breach are both likely.
Worked example 4: obvious adult risk
An adult trespasser enters land and deliberately climbs onto an obviously unstable structure for amusement despite having no reason to do so.
Even if D knows that people sometimes enter the land, s1(3)(c) requires careful application.
Relevant points include:
the danger is obvious
C is an adult
C voluntarily engages in a foolhardy activity
protection may require D to prevent people undertaking risks which are already clearly apparent.
These facts may support the conclusion that D cannot reasonably be expected to protect C from the particular risk.
A danger must be distinguished from C's activity
This distinction is especially important under the 1984 Act.
Ask:
Did C suffer injury because the premises contained a relevant danger, or because C chose to use otherwise ordinary premises in a dangerous way?
OCR's 2023 mark scheme highlights this in the woodland scenario.
There was nothing inherently dangerous about the trees merely existing. Felix created much of the risk by climbing a tall tree in the dark.
This can make it less reasonable to impose responsibility on the occupier.
Private Land is not the same as a warning of danger
The 2023 question contained a Private Land sign.
Some candidates treated this as a warning of the danger.
OCR's examiner report specifically identified this as incorrect. The sign existed mainly to establish that Felix knew he was trespassing. It did not actually warn him about a particular danger.
This gives you a useful distinction:
“Keep out” or “Private Land” may establish status.
but
A warning of danger must actually communicate something relevant to safety.
The detailed law on warnings under s1(5) belongs in defences and limitations under the 1984 Act [Lesson 124. Defences under the 1984 Act].
Do not import 1957 Act rules
The 1957 and 1984 Acts are connected, but they are not interchangeable.
For a trespasser, do not automatically use:
s2(1)
s2(2)
the child visitor rule in s2(3)(a)
the skilled visitor rule in s2(3)(b)
the independent-contractor rule in s2(4)(b).
Those belong to the 1957 Act.
For the 1984 Act, concentrate on:
s1(3) → s1(4) → relevant limitations or defences
OCR's 2022 examiner report specifically identified overlap and confusion between the two Acts as a weakness.
Duty and breach are separate issues
Another common error is to say:
“D satisfies s1(3), therefore D is liable.”
That is incomplete.
Section 1(3) establishes whether the duty exists.
You must then decide whether D met the standard imposed by s1(4).
A useful sequence is:
Trespasser → s1(3)(a) → s1(3)(b) → s1(3)(c) → s1(4) standard → breach → defences if required
This keeps the argument logically structured.
A complete OLA 1984 application method
Step 1: Identify the occupier and premises
Unless the question tells you these are undisputed, identify D's control and the premises.
Step 2: Establish trespasser status
Explain why C has no relevant permission or has exceeded permission.
Use Addie v Dumbreck or The Calgarth where appropriate.
Step 3: Identify the relevant danger
Be precise about the danger arising from the premises.
Step 4: Apply s1(3)(a)
Does D know or have reasonable grounds to believe the danger exists?
Step 5: Apply s1(3)(b)
Does D know or have reasonable grounds to believe trespassers may be in its vicinity?
Step 6: Apply s1(3)(c)
Can D reasonably be expected to offer some protection?
Consider only relevant factors such as:
nature of premises
practical precautions
seriousness of danger
age
obviousness
foolhardiness
C's expertise.
Step 7: Apply s1(4)
If a duty exists, did D take reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent injury from the danger?
Step 8: Conclude
State clearly:
whether a duty exists
whether it was breached.
Step 9: Defences
Only consider these if the question asks for them.
They are developed in defences under the 1984 Act [Lesson 124. Defences under the 1984 Act].
The 1957 and 1984 duties compared
OLA 1957 | OLA 1984 |
Applies to lawful visitors | Applies to trespassers or non-lawful visitors |
Lawful status is based on permission or other lawful right | C lacks relevant permission or has exceeded it |
Common duty arises under s2 | Duty arises only if the conditions in s1(3) are satisfied |
Requires reasonable care to see that the visitor is reasonably safe | Requires reasonable care in the circumstances to prevent injury from the relevant danger |
Separate statutory rules apply to children and skilled visitors | Different considerations apply under the 1984 Act |
This comparison helps you choose the correct Act, but do not turn every scenario question into a full comparison essay.
When a question narrows the issues
OCR may tell you that:
D's status as occupier is not disputed
C's status as trespasser is not disputed
defences should not be discussed.
The 2023 examination did exactly this.
Candidates were expected to concentrate on:
the scope of the Act
s1(3)
s1(4)
relevant obvious-risk considerations.
Anything expressly excluded by the question received no credit.
💡 Exam rule: If OCR gives you an element, accept it and move on.
Key Words 🔑
Key word | Student-friendly definition | How it may be used in an exam |
Trespasser | Someone on premises without the relevant permission, including a person who exceeds the limits of an earlier permission. | Used to determine whether the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 applies. |
s1(3) | The provision containing the three conditions which must be satisfied before the occupier owes the statutory duty. | Applied systematically when establishing duty. |
Vicinity | The area around the relevant danger in which D knows or has reasonable grounds to believe a trespasser may be present. | Used when applying s1(3)(b). |
Obvious risk | A danger which should be apparent to the trespasser and which may make it unreasonable to require D to offer protection. | Used particularly when applying s1(3)(c). |
s1(4) | The provision requiring reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent injury from the relevant danger once the duty arises. | Used to determine the standard owed and whether it has been breached. |
Hints from the Examiner Reports 💡
Examiner hint: Learn the three parts of s1(3) accurately. OCR's 2023 report found that stronger responses reproduced the statutory requirements closely and supported them with appropriate authority.
Use:
danger → trespasser in vicinity → reasonable protection
but explain each requirement fully.
Examiner hint: Keep s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b) separate. Weaker candidates often confused knowledge of the danger with knowledge that trespassers may be nearby.
Examiner hint: Use several factual clues where possible. In the 2023 question, stronger candidates used Henry's social-media knowledge, previous trespassing and routine patrols when applying s1(3)(b).
One factual reference is good. Several relevant facts can produce much stronger AO2.
Examiner hint: Use case law that actually helps the scenario. OCR praised candidates who linked Tomlinson to the impracticality of fencing a huge area of countryside.
The case should support the argument, not merely decorate the paragraph.
Examiner hint: Do not treat a “Private Land” sign as a warning of danger. OCR specifically noted that the sign in the Felix scenario established trespasser status rather than warning of the danger that caused the injury.
Examiner hint: Follow the rubric. In 2023, occupier status, trespasser status, defences and remedies were expressly excluded from the question and therefore gained no credit.
Common Mistakes ⚠️
Mistake: Assuming every unauthorised visitor is owed a duty
Why this is incorrect: The s1(3) requirements must be satisfied before the duty arises.
How to improve: Apply all three statutory conditions separately.
Mistake: Saying a trespasser must be committing a crime
Why this is incorrect: Trespasser status in occupiers’ liability depends on permission, not on applying a criminal-law label.
How to improve: Ask whether C has the relevant permission to be on the premises.
Mistake: Forgetting that a lawful visitor can become a trespasser
Why this is incorrect: Permission has limits.
How to improve: Use The Calgarth and consider whether C exceeded the permitted place or purpose.
Mistake: Confusing s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b)
Why this is incorrect: They concern two different forms of awareness.
How to improve: Remember:
(a) = danger
(b) = trespasser near danger
Mistake: Assuming s1(3)(a) and (b) automatically create a duty
Why this is incorrect: Section 1(3)(c) must also be satisfied.
How to improve: Always ask whether D can reasonably be expected to offer some protection.
Mistake: Assuming every natural feature is a dangerous premises defect
Why this is incorrect: OCR's 2023 woodland problem distinguishes the state of the premises from the danger created by C's own risky activity.
How to improve: Identify precisely what created the risk.
Mistake: Ignoring the practicality of precautions
Why this is incorrect: The law asks what protection is reasonable, not what would theoretically eliminate every possibility of injury.
How to improve: Compare realistic precautions with the scale and nature of the premises.
Mistake: Assuming obvious risks must always be removed
Why this is incorrect: OCR recognises that an adult trespasser's decision to engage in an obvious or foolhardy activity may mean the occupier cannot reasonably be expected to protect them.
How to improve: Consider the obviousness of the danger and C's own age, knowledge and expertise.
Mistake: Using the child rules from the 1957 Act
Why this is incorrect: A child trespasser falls within the statutory framework of the 1984 Act, not s2(3)(a) of the 1957 Act.
How to improve: Consider age within the circumstances relevant to the 1984 duty rather than importing the wrong statutory section.
Mistake: Treating s1(3) as breach
Why this is incorrect: Section 1(3) determines whether the duty arises. Section 1(4) determines what care is required once it exists.
How to improve: Use:
s1(3) duty → s1(4) standard → breach
Mistake: Saying “Private Land” is automatically an effective safety warning
Why this is incorrect: A notice about permission does not necessarily communicate anything about the actual danger.
How to improve: Distinguish trespasser-status notices from warnings about risks.
Exam-Style Questions ✍️
Question 1
Define a trespasser for the purposes of occupiers’ liability. (3 marks)
Question 2
Explain how a lawful visitor can become a trespasser. (3 marks)
Question 3
State and explain the three requirements in s1(3) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. (6 marks)
Question 4
Explain the duty imposed by s1(4) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. (4 marks)
Question 5
Northside Ltd controls an abandoned warehouse. It knows that a section of flooring has collapsed. It also knows that teenagers regularly enter the warehouse through a broken gate.
Apply s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b) to these facts. (4 marks)
Question 6
A large estate contains hundreds of acres of woodland. The occupier knows that adults sometimes trespass and climb trees at night. An experienced climber enters without permission, climbs a very tall tree in darkness and falls.
Apply s1(3)(c) to determine whether the occupier may reasonably be expected to offer protection. (6 marks)
Question 7
A hotel knows that guests sometimes enter a restricted swimming-pool room. The pool has been emptied for repairs and the unlit room contains a dangerous drop. The door can easily be locked but is routinely left open.
Assume that C has become a trespasser.
Advise whether the hotel is likely to owe and breach a duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. Do not discuss defences. (8 marks)
Question 8
Oakwood Farm contains a large area of woodland. The owner, Priya, knows from repeated incidents that adults enter without permission at night to climb trees and photograph nesting birds. She regularly patrols the land. It would be extremely difficult to fence the whole woodland or prevent individual trees from being climbed.
Marcus, aged 32, is an experienced wildlife photographer. He ignores a “Private Property” notice and enters the woodland at midnight. He climbs a tall tree despite being unable to see the branches clearly and falls, suffering serious injuries.
Advise Marcus whether Priya owes him a duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 and whether that duty has been breached. Do not discuss defences or remedies. (20 marks)
Answers and mark scheme
Question 1
3 marks
Award credit for:
a trespasser is someone on premises without the relevant permission (1)
their presence may be unknown to the occupier or objected to if known (1)
relevant authority is Addie v Dumbreck (1)
Question 2
3 marks
Award credit for:
a person may begin as a lawful visitor (1)
if C goes beyond the area or purpose covered by the permission, lawful status may end (1)
The Calgarth supports the principle that a lawful visitor can become a trespasser by exceeding permission (1)
Question 3
6 marks
Award two marks for each accurately explained requirement:
s1(3)(a)D must be aware of the danger or have reasonable grounds to believe that it exists. (2)
s1(3)(b)D must know or have reasonable grounds to believe that C is, or may come, into the vicinity of the danger. (2)
s1(3)(c)The risk must be one against which, in all the circumstances, D may reasonably be expected to offer C some protection. (2)
Question 4
4 marks
Award credit for:
s1(4) applies where the relevant statutory duty arises (1)
D must take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances (1)
the purpose is to prevent the trespasser suffering injury (1)
the injury must arise from the danger concerned on the premises (1)
Question 5
4 marks
Award credit for:
s1(3)(a) concerns D's awareness of the danger (1)
Northside knows that the floor has collapsed, so this requirement is satisfied (1)
s1(3)(b) concerns knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe trespassers may come into the vicinity (1)
Northside knows teenagers regularly enter through the broken gate, strongly supporting satisfaction of s1(3)(b) (1)
Question 6
6 marks
A strong response should explain:
s1(3)(c) asks whether the risk is one against which D may reasonably be expected to offer some protection (1)
the size and nature of the woodland make complete prevention difficult (1)
fencing hundreds of acres or preventing every tree being climbed may be impractical, reflecting the reasoning associated with Tomlinson (1)
climbing a tall tree at night is an obvious and dangerous activity (1)
C is an adult experienced climber, so expertise may further support expecting C to appreciate the danger, consistent with Donoghue v Folkestone (1)
D is therefore unlikely to be reasonably expected to protect C against this particular risk (1)
Question 7
8 marks
Award credit for:
the 1984 Act governs the trespasser's position (1)
s1(3)(a) is likely satisfied because the hotel knows the empty, dark pool room presents a danger (1)
s1(3)(b) is likely satisfied because the hotel knows guests sometimes enter the restricted room (1)
s1(3)(c) asks whether protection could reasonably be expected (1)
locking the door is a straightforward and practical precaution (1)
the statutory duty is therefore likely to arise (1)
under s1(4), the hotel must take reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent injury from that danger (1)
routinely leaving the door open despite the known danger and easy precaution is likely to amount to breach (1)
Question 8
20 marks
A strong answer should apply the statutory provisions systematically.
Status and applicable law
Marcus enters without permission and ignores a “Private Property” notice.
He is therefore a trespasser and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 applies.
The notice establishes the absence of permission, but does not itself amount to a warning of the danger of climbing trees.
Section 1(3)(a)
Priya must be aware of the danger or have reasonable grounds to believe it exists.
She knows adults enter the woodland and climb trees at night.
Her regular patrols and knowledge of previous incidents support awareness of the relevant risk.
Section 1(3)(a) is therefore likely to be satisfied.
Section 1(3)(b)
Priya must know or have reasonable grounds to believe that trespassers may be in the vicinity of the danger.
Repeated incidents show that adults regularly enter the woodland.
Priya knows specifically that they climb trees.
Her patrols provide further evidence of awareness.
Section 1(3)(b) is therefore likely to be satisfied.
Section 1(3)(c)
This is likely to be decisive.
Relevant factors include:
the woodland covers a very large area
fencing the entire site would be extremely difficult
preventing individual trees from being climbed would also be impractical
the tree itself is not stated to contain a hidden defect
Marcus deliberately chooses to climb a tall tree at midnight
inability to see the branches makes the risk obvious
Marcus is 32, so he is an adult capable of appreciating the danger
his experience as a wildlife photographer may make him particularly aware of the risks involved in climbing to photograph nesting birds.
Authorities such as Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council support considering the impracticality of protecting people from obvious risks across large natural areas.
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties supports taking account of foolhardy conduct and expertise.
Priya therefore has a strong argument that this is not a risk against which she may reasonably be expected to offer Marcus protection.
Section 1(4)
If s1(3)(c) is not satisfied, no statutory duty arises and there is no need to establish breach under s1(4).
Alternatively, if a court did find a duty, s1(4) would require only such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances.
Given:
the enormous size of the land
the impracticality of preventing access to every tree
the obvious nature of climbing a tall tree in darkness
Marcus's age and experience
it would be difficult to establish that Priya failed to take reasonable care.
Overall conclusion
Priya is likely to satisfy the awareness requirements in s1(3)(a) and s1(3)(b).
However, Marcus is unlikely to establish s1(3)(c) because it would be unreasonable to expect Priya to prevent an experienced adult trespasser from deliberately taking the obvious risk of climbing a tall tree at night across a large woodland.
Priya is therefore unlikely to owe Marcus a duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. Even if a duty were found, the same circumstances would make breach under s1(4) difficult to establish.
A high-level response should keep each part of s1(3) distinct, use relevant factual evidence for every requirement and avoid introducing defences or remedies where the question expressly excludes them.
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